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Abstract — In response to poor quality of service (QoS), users self-regulate, i.e. they immediately release bandwidth and abandon network. 
However, there are studies that show users are willing to tolerate poor QoS for some time to evaluate if network performance will improve before 
abandoning the network. In this paper, we investigate how user’s willingness to wait for improved QoS may influence network activities, such as 
network pricing, bandwidth allocation, network revenue, and performance. We develop and employ a self-regulation model that includes user 
evaluation of QoS before deciding to abandon or stay in the network. This model considers these two factors: user tolerance of low QoS and the 
price per unit a user is willing to pay. Our investigation uncovers a double edged problem - network may be populated with lower paying users, who 
are also dissatisfied. These lower paying users drive the price higher than the price produced by conventional solution for network congestion. This 
leads to our proposal for a market informed congestion control scheme, where network resolves congestion based on user profile that is defined by 
their ability to pay and demand for bandwidth.    
Index Terms — Congestion control, Bandwidth allocation, Network Utility Maximization, Real-time network traffic. 
——————————      —————————— 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Network congestion has been widely studied over the years. 
Many proposed solutions [3,8,12,20,29,33] seek to quickly 
resolve the congestion problem, so users can be prevented from 
experiencing poor quality of service (QoS). In these solutions 
users are assumed to instantaneously release and abandon 
network immediately after experiencing poor QoS. However, a 
study by Krishnan and Sitaraman in [7], shows that users 
generally demonstrate tolerance toward poor network 
connection or poor QoS for a short period of time during which 
they assess whether the network performance will improve 
before deciding to leave or remain in the network. In this paper, 
we investigate the impact of such user tolerance and user 
deliberation period on network activities, such as pricing, 
bandwidth allocation, revenue, network inhabitance, and 
network performance. We develop a user self-regulation model 
that captures user self-governing policies to stop or continue 
transmitting data when he/she experiences poor QoS. Then, 
based upon the outcome of the investigation, we propose 
Market-Informed Congestion Control (MICC) protocol to 
resolve network congestion while considering how users behave 
toward poor QoS.  
The proposed self-regulation model incorporates two 
important and related factors: user tolerance toward poor QoS 
and the bit price, which is the price per unit a user is willing to 
pay. Informed by findings in [7], our model considers a period 
of waiting or deliberation time during which a user observes 
whether the network condition improves within a certain 
window of time. Importantly, we assert that user expectation of 
QoS and therefore, their tolerance for poor performance is 
related to the price he/she is willing to pay. Various studies [23-
27] provide the evidence that price may influence user 
expectation toward the quality of product or service and hence, 
their relative tolerance of lower quality. In [25], the author 
observes users may be willing to adjust their expectation toward 
product or service quality given a lower price. Our self-regulate 
model considers this behavior: where depending on the price 
he/she is willing to pay at that point of time, a user may not 
immediately abandon the network when QoS falls below the 
threshold, and that he/she may linger and wait for some time to 
observe whether performance eventually improves. 
The in-depth analysis of the impact of user tolerance of poor 
QoS, user deliberation and self-regulation is important because 
it provides a more precise understanding of user’s evaluation of 
network service. This in turn provides critical guidance for how 
network can allocate its limited bandwidth resources to achieve 
the multiple objectives of user utility, network revenue, and 
network performance.  
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows. 
We first investigate how poor QoS impacts the network by 
employing a self-regulate model that incorporates user tolerance 
for poor QoS and their expectation for QoS relative to the price 
they are willing to pay. We employ Network Utility 
Maximization (NUM) framework [1,2,3,4,5] to analyze the 
impact of self-regulation model with tolerance; NUM is a 
framework to allocate bandwidth to users while maximizing the 
total users’ satisfaction subject to network capacity constraints. 
Our analysis reveals two insights: firstly, user tolerance drives 
the price charged to users for the service higher than the price 
produced by conventional solution for network congestion. 
Secondly, we show that network may be populated with lower 
paying users who are dissatisfied. To overcome the problems 
uncovered in our investigation, we propose market informed 
congestion control (MICC) protocol to resolve network 
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congestion. The MICC algorithm resolves network congestion 
by charging the minimum bid price but also causes the 
transmitted data to fall below the network capacity. In other 
words, given information on users’ willingness to pay, MICC 
quickly searches the minimum affordable price that resolves the 
congestion.  
When congestion is resolved, our solution provides the upper 
bound for both the time required to resolve congestion and for 
the optimal price. Further, this approach provides a mechanism 
to cluster users according to their bid price, forming categories 
of premium users, middle-paying users, etc. We demonstrate that 
implementation of MICC is favorable to retaining middle paying 
and satisfied users when congestion occurs. This is in contrast to 
network being inhabited by lower-paying and dissatisfied users 
prior to implementing MICC. Finally, we also discover that 
when a network undertakes a progressive pricing approach, there 
is a “sweet spot” for pricing that attains three benefits: the 
desirable price at which the network generates higher revenue, 
users are satisfied with the service, and congestion is resolved. 
We begin our paper with related works in section II. Following 
this, we present our major contributions: the proposal for the new 
self-regulate model and the market-informed congestion control 
in section III and IV respectively. The simulation results are 
presented and discussed in section V, followed by concluding 
remarks.    
2. RELATED WORKS 
2.1 Existing Self-Regulate Models  
When users receive bandwidth allocation below their 
minimum requirement, they experience poor network quality. 
This leads to a proposal by Lee et al. in [3] that some users may 
self-regulate, i.e. release bandwidth and abandon the network 
when the condition is not desirable, such as when the QoS falls 
below the minimum and/or when the price for bandwidth 
becomes too high. This and other previously developed self-
regulate models [3,8] assume that users have zero tolerance 
toward poor network performance, and will immediately 
discontinue transmitting data when the QoS falls below the 
minimum. In [8], the authors propose a self-regulate algorithm 
based on user’s reactions toward price fluctuations, where user 
immediately abandons the network when the price becomes too 
high. Our self-regulate model differs in that a user may not 
immediately abandon the network when QoS falls below the 
threshold. Rather, a user may linger and wait for some time to 
observe whether performance eventually improves, and that one 
degree of tolerance to tolerate poor QoS is affected by the price 
one is willing to pay at that particular point in time. 
In most other self-regulate models user behavior is not given 
a serious consideration. For instance, authors of [18] propose 
self-regulation algorithm for wireless stations that maximizes the 
targeted overall network utilization. Authors of [21,22,23] 
propose self-regulation algorithm for wireless sensor nodes to 
maximize network utility or to overcome congestion by 
adjusting the transmission rate according to the changes in the 
environment. However, how a user responds to poor QoS is not 
addressed. In [19], while the author analyzes the behavior of self-
regulating users, the intent is to achieve optimal social welfare 
by requiring coordination among users to avoid over 
contributing data in a peer-to-peer file sharing environment. As 
apposed, we consider that users are more interested in their 
personal gain rather than social welfare. The authors of [20] 
suggest a self-regulate model with learning algorithm, which is 
based upon the availability of network traffic data. In practice, 
such data is not usually available to users in real time. 
2.2 Network Utility Maximization  
Consider a network with link capacity 𝐶 over the links, given 
a utility function  𝑈𝑠(𝑥𝑠) of user s with the allocated bandwidth 
of 𝑥𝑠, the NUM formulation becomes 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒  ∑  𝑈𝑠(𝑥𝑠)
𝑠∈𝑆
,                              (1)  
𝑠. 𝑡.   ∑ 𝑥𝑠
𝑠𝜖𝑆
≤ 𝐶  
𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑥𝑠 ≥ 0, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, 
where S is a set of user 𝑠. In this paper, we only consider non-
concave functions. Let 𝑚𝑠 denote the budget of user 𝑠 to pay for 
the service and 𝜆, the price charged by network provider, One 
such user utility function 𝑈𝑠(𝑥𝑠) can be defined as follows.  
𝑈𝑠(𝑥𝑠) =
1
(1 +  ℮−𝜃 𝑥𝑠) 
+
 𝑚𝑠
𝑥𝑠 𝜆
  , 
where 𝜃 is a positive constant. The NUM is formulated into A 
Lagrangian optimization problem as follows.  
𝐿(𝑥, 𝜆) = ∑ 𝑈𝑠(𝑥𝑠)
𝑠𝜖𝑆
− ∑ 𝜆 𝑥𝑠
𝑠𝜖𝑆
+ 𝜆 𝐶, 
where 𝐿(𝑥, 𝜆) is the Lagrangian form, 𝑥 is a set of bandwidth 
allocation 𝑥𝑠, and 𝜆 is known as Lagrangian multipliers which is 
often interpreted as the link price. Typically, the dual problem 
min 𝐷(𝜆) to the primal problem of (1) is constructed as follows  
min 𝐷(𝜆)                                        (2) 
𝑠. 𝑡   𝜆 ≥ 0, 
where the dual function is given by 
𝐷(𝜆) =  max
 0 ≤ 𝑥𝑠≤ 𝑥𝑠
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐿(𝑥, 𝜆), 
A common approach to the dual problem is to use the 
subgradient method [3]. The transmission rate 𝑥𝑠(𝜆) of user 𝑠 at 
price 𝜆 can be computed in a distributed manner by   
𝑥𝑠 =  arg max
0 ≤ 𝑥𝑠≤ 𝑥𝑠
∗
 (𝑈𝑠(𝑥𝑠)).                       (3) 
A subgradient projection method is used in [3], which is how the 
network adjusts the price, resulting in an iterative solution given 
by  
𝜆𝑡+1 =  [𝜆𝑡 − 𝜎𝑡 (𝐶 − ∑ 𝑥𝑠
𝑠𝜖𝑆
 𝜆𝑡) ]
+
,              (4) 
where 𝑥𝑠(𝜆) is the solution of (2), 𝐶 − ∑ 𝑥𝑠𝑠𝜖𝑆  𝜆
𝑡  is a 
subgradient of 𝐷(𝜆), for 𝜆 ≥ 𝜆𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≥ 0, and 𝜎𝑡 denotes the step 
size to control the tradeoff between a convergence guarantee and 
the convergence speed.  
  
Algorithm 1: Sub-gradient Based Algorithm 
1. Set price 𝜆 = 𝜆𝑚𝑖𝑛. 
2. Repeat  
3.       ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, user 𝑠 solves for 𝑥𝑠(𝜆
𝑡) in (2). 
4.       Network providers solves for 𝜆𝑡+1 in (3). 
5.       If (𝜆𝑡+1 > 𝜆𝑚𝑖𝑛) then 𝜆𝑡+1 = 𝜆𝑚𝑖𝑛 . 
6. Until 𝜆𝑡  converges to a value.  
Remark. The standard solution to the NUM problems relies on 
feedback mechanism that uses network price to influence 
transmission rate. That is, users determine the transmission rate 
in (2) according to the price set by network and the price is 
adjusted according to the traffic load by solving (3). The process 
is repeated until it converges to an optimal solution.  
3. SELF-REGULATION 
Our self-regulate model is founded on two important and 
related elements: the price user is willing to pay and user 
tolerance toward poor QoS. We begin by defining and 
explaining the concept of the price a user is willing to pay, 
followed by a summary of relevant studies on how user behavior 
relating to QoS is influenced by the price they are willing to pay. 
Definition 1: User self-regulation: The self-governance policy 
by which a user decides to stop or continue transmitting data into 
the network. 
3.1 The Price User is Willing to Pay  
Consider a non-concave utility function for user 𝑠 as depicted 
in Figure 1. Let 𝑥𝑠
∗denote the minimum bandwidth requirement 
of users. Then, 𝑥𝑠
∗ = ?̂?𝑠
−1, for 0 ≤ 𝑥𝑠
∗ ≤  𝑥𝑠
𝑚𝑎𝑥 , where ?̂?𝑠 is the 
minimum utility of user 𝑠 and ?̂?𝑠
−1 is the inverse function of ?̂?𝑠. 
 
Figure 1. Sigmoidal function 
Definition 2: The bid price ?̂? is the upper limit of the monetary 
value per unit a user is willing to spend for network service. 
This ?̂? can also be interpreted as the maximum value that a user 
is willing to spend for 𝑥𝑠
∗. For example, a user may be willing to 
pay a certain amount for 100 Mbps connection, but not for 1 
Mbps. When user 𝑠 pays 𝜆𝑠 pays for unit bandwidth to network, 
the total cost need to be within the budget;   𝑥𝑠
∗ 𝜆𝑠 ≤  𝑚𝑠 + 𝜀, for 
some positive constant 𝜀. Thus, given the budget 𝑚𝑠 and the 
assumption that user 𝑠 knows  𝑥𝑠
∗ through one experience using 
the service, the maximum bid price ?̂?𝑠 is calculated by solving  
?̂?𝑠 =
 𝑚𝑠
𝑥𝑠∗
 . 
This concept is very useful for network to determine the price to 
resolve congestion quickly, such that the congested link becomes 
feasible. In another words, the traffic load is below the link 
capacity. 
3.2 The Relationship between Price and User Tolerance 
Various studies [23-27] provide the evidence that price may 
influence user expectation toward a product or service quality 
and hence, their relative tolerance toward low quality. In [25], 
the author observes users may be willing to adjust their 
expectation toward product or service quality given a lower 
price. The authors of [25,28] discover users who experience 
good QoS and find that the price is within their budget are more 
willing to tolerate poor QoS to a certain level within a small 
window of time. In addition, the study [23] reports the price a 
user is willing to pay is also an indication of how much the user 
is willing to tolerate poor QoS. The study further explains that 
when users are satisfied with the QoS, they are more willing to 
tolerate price increase up to a certain level. At the same time, 
those paying more are also more sensitive to changes in QoS.  
More specific to network QoS, studies by Krishnan and 
Sitaraman [6,7] show that users generally demonstrate some 
tolerance toward poor network connection, and that user 
tolerance for poor QoS varies with the type and duration of use. 
For example, based on the data of network traffic collected [7], 
users generally are willing to tolerate a start-up delay for a short 
video streaming service for 4 seconds, while less patient users 
are only willing to wait for 2 seconds. They also discover there 
is more tolerance toward longer start-up delay in long videos, 
such as movies. Additionally, they report that users are willing 
to tolerate interruption when watching video streaming if the 
total interruption or “freeze” is less than 1% of the entire video 
duration. Supported by these studies, we develop a new self-
regulation model incorporating this strong correlation between 
the price a user is willing to pay, user expectation and QoS. 
Assumption 1. Based upon discussion above, we assume 
1. Higher paying users tent to be more impatient. 
2. Users are willing to tolerate poor QoS to certain point. 
3.3 User Self-Regulation with Tolerance  
First of all, we assume that users are naturally selfish and their 
objective is to maximize their own utility, 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒  𝑈𝑠(𝑥𝑠(𝜆)) 
𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟   0 ≤ 𝑥𝑠
∗ ≤ 𝑥𝑠(𝜆). 
Then, users solve the maximization problem above by solving 
(3). However, when the aggregate traffic flow exceeds the 
capacity, network may not even be able to provide the minimum 
required bandwidth to users. Consequently, users may receive 
less than the minimum required bandwidth when 𝑥𝑠(𝜆) ≤ 𝑥𝑠
∗, 
and user utility may drop after experiencing poor network quality 
for some time, and eventually leave the network if the condition 
does not improve as reported in [11]. 
𝑥𝑠
∗ 
U(𝑥𝑠) 
𝑥𝑠 
  
With the assumption that a user is willing to wait for some 
time for the quality to improve rather than immediately leaving 
the network when the quality drops below 𝑥𝑠
∗, we extend our 
utility function  𝑈𝑠(𝑥𝑠(𝜆))  as follows. 
𝑈𝑠(𝑥𝑠(𝜆)) = {
𝑈𝛿(𝑥𝑠(𝜆), 𝜆, ?̂?, 𝑡),       𝑥𝑠(𝜆) ≤ 𝑥𝑠
∗
𝑈𝑠(𝑥𝑠(𝜆)) ,                  𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒,
 
 
where 𝑈𝛿(𝑥𝑠(𝜆), 𝜆, ?̂?, 𝑡) is the function that captures user utility 
when user experiences poor quality over a period of time 𝑡, and 
the function 𝑈𝛿(𝑥𝑠(𝜆), 𝜆, ?̂?, 𝑡) is defined as follows.  
𝑈𝛿(𝑥𝑠(𝜆), 𝜆, ?̂?, 𝑡) = 𝑎 𝑈𝑠(𝑥𝑠(𝜆)) − 𝑏 𝛿𝑈𝑠(𝜆, ?̂?, 𝑡), 
where a and b are positive constant used for normalization. 
Function 𝛿𝑈𝑠(𝜆, ?̂?, 𝑡) can be interpreted as user dissatisfaction 
over duration of time 𝑡.  In other words, user may become 
impatient when 𝑥𝑠(𝜆)  <  𝑥𝑠
∗ over duration 𝑡 as user utility 
decreases and QoS does not improve. Function 𝛿𝑈𝑠(𝜆, ?̂?, 𝑡) can 
for example have the following form:  
𝛿𝑈𝑠(𝜆, ?̂?, 𝑡) = ((𝜎 +
?̂?
𝜆𝑡
) 𝑡)
𝛽
, for 𝑡 → ∞, 
where the parameter 𝛽 ≥ 0 specifies user tolerance for poor 
QoS, 𝜎 is the weight, 0 ≤ 𝜎 ≤ 1, and 𝜆𝑡  denotes 𝜆 at 𝑡. Large 𝛽 
means a user is impatient; smaller 𝛽 means a user is willing to 
tolerate poor QoS longer. Also, a the larger 𝑡 value means the 
longer a user has to wait for QoS to improve. In addition, the 
rationale for price ratio 𝜎 +
?̂?
𝜆𝑡
 is that user tolerance for poor QoS 
has a reverse relationship with the price a user is willing to pay, 
relative to the price 𝜆 network sets. In other words, lower paying 
users generally have greater tolerance for poor QoS and higher 
paying users demonstrate lower tolerance. Authors of [28] 
explain this is because higher paying users have more economic 
latitude to switch to a different service provider, while lower 
paying users may not. We summarize the property of the 
patience function as follows. 
The properties of the patience function: 
A. 𝛿𝑈𝑠(𝜆, ?̂?, 𝑡) increases when 𝑥𝑠(𝜆) ≤ 𝑥𝑠
∗. 
B. 𝑈𝑠(𝑥𝑠(𝜆)) decreases when 𝑥𝑠(𝜆) ≤ 𝑥𝑠∗. 
C. Since 𝛿𝑈𝑠(𝜆, ?̂?, 𝑡) is subtracted from 𝑈𝑠(𝑥𝑠(𝜆)), the more 
dissatisfaction, the bigger 𝛿𝑈𝑠(𝜆, ?̂?, 𝑡), but a larger 𝑡 makes 
𝑈𝑠(𝑥𝑠(𝜆)) smaller.  
Let 𝛿𝑠
𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑑 be the threshold when excessive congestion occurs and 
the poor performance becomes intolerable, such that when 
𝑈𝑠(𝑥𝑠(𝜆)) <  𝛿𝑠
𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑑, user self regulates to release the bandwidth 
and voluntarily discharge. Property (A) and (b) imply that user 
becomes more dissatisfied when user experience poor QoS, 
which resulting in lower user utility. Chiang et al. proposes a 
similar function called “waiting function” in [22] where the 
function decreases as the waiting gets longer. He also observes 
that estimating the parameters for waiting function of different 
applications is very difficult because there are too many of them. 
Definition 3: Voluntarily discharge is when a user stops 
transmitting data when he/she can no longer tolerate the poor 
performance. 
The properties of voluntary discharge: 
1. Each user has his/her voluntary discharge policy. 
2. User stops transmitting data when 𝑈𝑠 < 𝛿𝑠
𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑑 .  
3. The network price is higher than what the user is willing to 
pay. i.e. ?̂?𝑠 <  𝜆, and user 𝑠 is not willing to increase his/her 
budget 𝑚𝑠. 
Remark. Property (3) means the network price 𝜆 is too high for 
the users. Property (4) provides the condition for when a user is 
to voluntary discharge. 
The new self-regulation model discussed above can be 
incorporated to NUM and used Algorithm 1 to resolve the 
network congestion. In our previous work in [29], we have 
shown that Algorithm 1 converges when there is no new user 
joining the network before the algorithm converges. The 
mathematical proof is provided in [29].  However, when the 
arrival rate of new users exceeds the departure rate of existing 
users, Algorithm 1 may not converge and user self-regulation 
does not always lead to link feasibility. Thereafter, we analyze 
the effects of user self-regulation with tolerance for poor QoS on 
network pricing by employing algorithm 1. First of all, we can 
clearly observe that user self-regulation with tolerance leads to 
higher pricing compared to the price generated when user 
tolerance is not considered. The reason is that users waiting for 
QoS to improve can be interpreted by the network as demand for 
bandwidth, resulting in higher pricing. Secondly, after a series of 
changes in the composition of user population and a series of 
congestions, our self-regulation model with tolerance reveals 
that the network may end up with unhappy lower paying users. 
This is because the higher paying users are the first users to leave 
the network, and lower paying users, having higher tolerance for 
poor QoS, tend to remain in the network. Adding further strain 
on the network is bandwidth demand from incoming new users, 
which leads to another round of network congestion. As a result, 
users may receive bandwidth below the required minimum, 
resulting in lower user satisfaction.  
4. Market-Informed Congestion Control 
4.1 MICC Protocol 
Therefore, in order to preserve QoS, we propose a congestion 
control scheme that builds on the concept of the price user is 
willing to pay. We term this as market-informed congestion 
control (MICC). The premise of this congestion control scheme 
is to quickly find the price that leads to congestion resolution 
based on the financial topology of users. In the following section, 
we discuss the methodology, followed by an analysis of the 
implications of the methodology. MICC largely addresses the 
traffic in the last-mile connectivity to end users where bottleneck 
commonly occurs [32]. The discussion will be focused on single 
link (single-homing), and MICC in multi links (multi-homing) 
will be addressed later. Moreover, we assume information on the 
bid price is available to network provider.  
Let ?̂?𝑆𝐸𝑇 = {?̂?0, ?̂?1, ?̂?2, … , ?̂?|𝑆|}, , and ?̂?𝑠 ≥ 0 denote bit price. The 
network price 𝜆 is determined by solving   
𝜆 = min ( {?̂?𝑆𝐸𝑇}  | ∑ 𝑥𝑠(?̂?𝑖) 
𝑠∈𝑆
≤ 𝐶),                    (8) 
  
Here, we also assume that 𝜆 ≥ 𝜆𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≥ 0, where 𝜆𝑚𝑖𝑛 is the 
minimum price decided by the network [12]. Thus,  
𝜆 = {
𝜆𝑚𝑖𝑛 ,      𝜆 < 𝜆𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝜆,         𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒.
  
 Here, we have 𝜆𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≥ 0 to ensure that 𝜆 is always positive.   
For clarity, we provide a simple illustration with a congested 
single link network with three users 𝑠0, 𝑠1 , and 𝑠2; and how bid 
price is used to resolve the congestion. Assume network has 
collected a set of bid price ?̂?𝑆𝐸𝑇 and sort ?̂?𝑆𝐸𝑇 = {?̂?0, ?̂?1, ?̂?2}, 
where 0 < ?̂?0 < ?̂?1 < ?̂?2. When the congestion occurs, the 
network computes 𝜆 = ?̂?𝑖 by solving (8), and charges user with 
?̂?𝑖. Then, each user updates the transmission rate according to ?̂?𝑖 
by solving (3). If the link becomes feasible, network stops the 
process and uses ?̂?𝑖. Otherwise, remove ?̂?𝑖 from ?̂?𝑆𝐸𝑇, that is 
?̂?𝑆𝐸𝑇 = ?̂?𝑆𝐸𝑇 − ?̂?𝑖 ,  and then network decides 𝜆 by solving (8). 
In other words, this process stops when the link becomes feasible 
or when ?̂?𝑆𝐸𝑇 is empty.   
Next, from this illustration, we consider three cases.   
Case 1: The link becomes feasible at ?̂?0. Observe that other users 
who are willing to pay higher than ?̂?0, can certainly afford the 
price per unit ?̂?0. However, ?̂?0 may not be optimal because the 
optimal price 𝜆∗ ≤ ?̂?0, which means the optimal price per unit 
will not be more expensive than ?̂?0. The proof is provided in a 
later discussion. However, ?̂?0 may also potentially lead to 
overpricing. Thus, to avoid overpricing, the gap between 𝜆∗ and  
?̂?0 must be considered.  
Case 2: The link becomes feasible after ?̂?1 is selected. Observe 
that user 𝑠0 with ?̂?0 may not be able to afford ?̂?1 but user 𝑠1 and 
𝑠2 are able to. Here, we show that the algorithm categorizes users 
according to their ability or willingness to pay, i.e. grouping 
them based on whether they can and cannot afford the service at 
?̂?1
𝑙 . In this case, intuitively we have ?̂?0 ≤ 𝜆
∗ ≤  ?̂?1.   
Case 3: The link is still not feasible even after ?̂?2 is selected. 
This means that the optimal price 𝜆∗ is beyond what the market 
can tolerate, which also means the congestion cannot be 
resolved. In other words, the link is feasible when 𝜆∗ > ?̂?2.  
In practice, to compile the price list of set ?̂?𝑆𝐸𝑇, network 
provider may conduct a market survey. In the survey, users are 
observed on the price they are willing to expend for varying 
qualities of connection. The data is analyzed to compile the price 
list of set ?̂?𝑆𝐸𝑇 which may consist of the average price users are 
willing to pay according to different demographic profiles and 
geographic locations, etc.    
Algorithm 2: MICC algorithm 
1. Sort ?̂?𝑆𝐸𝑇 in descending order. 
2. for 𝑖 ≤ |?̂?𝑆𝐸𝑇|  
3.        𝜆 = ?̂?𝑖 = min(?̂?𝑆𝐸𝑇)  
4.       user 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 computes 𝑥𝑠(𝜆) by solving(1) 
5.       if   (∑ 𝑥𝑠𝑠∈𝑆 > 𝐶) && (?̂?𝑆𝐸𝑇 ! = 0) 
6.                 ?̂?𝑆𝐸𝑇 =  ?̂?𝑆𝐸𝑇 − {?̂?𝑖} 
7.       else return 𝜆 
8. if  (∑ 𝑥𝑠𝑠∈𝑆 > 𝐶𝑙) && (|?̂?𝑆𝐸𝑇| == 0) 
9.        return  ∞    // price is not affordable  
Remark. We present MICC in algorithm 2. Given a sorted ?̂?𝑆𝐸𝑇, 
MICC iteratively search for price ?̂?𝑖 that resolve the congestion 
from  set ?̂?𝑆𝐸𝑇, for 𝑖 = (1,2, … , |?̂?𝑆𝐸𝑇| ). However, if there is no 
price in set ?̂?𝑆𝐸𝑇 which resolves the congestion, then MICC returns 
to ∞. In other words, there is no price that users are able to afford. 
The performance of this algorithm is determined by the number 
of iterations required to obtain the appropriate  𝜆, which is 
𝑂(|?̂?𝑆𝐸𝑇|), and the time to sort ?̂?𝑆𝐸𝑇 , which is 
𝑂(|?̂?𝑆𝐸𝑇| log(|?̂?𝑆𝐸𝑇|)). Thus, the time required is 𝑂(|?̂?𝑆𝐸𝑇| +
 |?̂?𝑆𝐸𝑇| log(|?̂?𝑆𝐸𝑇|)). In comparison to the subgradient based 
method, the number of steps in our proposed algorithm is 
bounded by 𝑂(|?̂?𝑆𝐸𝑇|), i.e. much fewer steps than would be 
required by subgradient based method. It is also done in a 
distributed manner, where the decision is done locally.   
Next, let ?̂?∗ denotes the selected price chosen by algorithm 2 
from the list of price in set ?̂?𝑆𝐸𝑇, we show that the optimal price 
𝜆∗ is upper bounded by ?̂?∗.  
Proposition 1: The optimal price is upper bounded by the 
selected price when the link is feasible, i.e.  𝜆∗ ≤ ?̂?∗ when 
∑ 𝑥𝑠(?̂?
∗) 𝑠∈𝑆 ≤ 𝐶. 
The Proof of proposition 1 is provided in the appendix.  
Remark. Proposition 1 implies that the selected price ?̂?∗ is the 
price ceiling of a given market. Meaning, by understanding the 
range of prices users can afford in a given market, selected price 
?̂?∗ can be utilized as a starting point in deciding the pricing 
brackets to classify users to different categories, such as 
premium, economical, and value categories.  Another advantage 
is that, since ?̂?∗ is determined by the market, ?̂?∗ can be also used 
as the starting point for flat pricing. However, this approach may 
lead to overpricing when the gap between ?̂?∗ and 𝜆∗ is too large. 
4.2 Discussion 
Previously, our discussion on MICC focuses on single link 
(single homing). The same concept on MICC can be applied to 
address congestion that occurs in multiple links. 
In a distributed environment, data traffic from network 
provider may have to go through several regions before reaching 
the end users. Thus, a route 𝑟𝑠 may consist of multiple links and 
?̂?𝑠 must be distributed to multiple links in route 𝑟𝑠, such that ?̂?𝑠 =
∑  ?̂?𝑠
𝑙
 𝑙𝜖𝑟𝑠 . One approach is to distribute the price according to the 
load of the link, where more money is allocated to heavier traffic 
load. Thus, the distribution is defined as follows.    
?̂?𝑠
𝑙 =  𝑤𝑠
𝑙  
?̂?𝑠
|𝑟𝑠|
 ,   ∀𝑙 ∈ 𝑟𝑠 , 
where 𝑤𝑠
𝑙  denotes the weight on 𝑙 ∈ 𝑟𝑠, for 𝑤𝑠
𝑙 ≥ 0 and  
∑  𝑤𝑠
𝑙
𝑙(𝑠) = 1, and ?̂?𝑠
𝑙  is the amount of money allocated on link 𝑙 
by users 𝑠. Next, we define 𝑤𝑠
𝑙  as follows. 
𝑤𝑠
𝑙 =  
∑  𝑥𝑠′𝑠′∈𝑙(𝑠)
∑ ∑   𝑥𝑠′𝑠′∈𝑙𝑠𝑙𝜖𝑟𝑠
  ∀𝑙 ∈ 𝑠, 
where 𝑙𝑠 denotes the link where the flow of user 𝑠 traverses,  
∑  𝑥𝑠′𝑠′∈𝑙𝑠  is the traffic load of all flows that traverse over link 𝑙𝑠, 
  
and 𝑠′ ∈ 𝑙𝑠 denotes other user 𝑠
′ that share link 𝑙 with user 𝑠. In 
this context, weight 𝑤𝑠
𝑙  is a ratio between the traffic load on 𝑙 and 
the traffic along path 𝑟𝑠. This can be done by users sending a 
packet to collect the information on the traffic along route 𝑟𝑠, use 
the information to compute 𝑤𝑠
𝑙 , and distribute ?̂?𝑠 along  route 𝑟𝑠 
accordingly. The implementation can be done by using ICMP’s 
traceroute function [31]. This way, we take advantage of the 
unused reserved type in ICMP header to collect the necessary 
information from each router on the path 𝑟𝑠 used by user 𝑠. 
5. SIMULATION AND DISCUSSION 
In this section, we evaluate the impact of users’ responses to 
poor QoS on network activities after implementing market-
informed congestion control and investigate how the 
implementation of MICC may change the user landscape and 
influence network revenue. In this simulation, given the quality 
of the connection, the assumption 1 discussed in the early section 
influences how users may self-regulate themself whether 
abandoning or staying in the network.    
 
Fig. 2. Network Topology. 
5.1 Network Inhabitance 
In this simulation, users are categorized into five clusters 
according to the price they are willing to pay  
?̂?, as described in table 1. There are five users in each cluster 
with different willingness to tolerate poor QoS, and the 
minimum bandwidth requirement is 𝑥𝑠
∗ = 2.5. Thus, there are 
twenty five users in the network as illustrated in Figure 2. Each 
link has a capacity of 40. To address the impact of users’ 
responses to poor QoS on the network, we assume that users 
from the same class share the same routing path. We also assume 
that the minimum link price 𝜆𝑙
𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0. Hence, network only 
charges service fee when congestion occurs.  
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 
Path AB AB ABCDE ABCD ABCDE 
?̂? 2 4 6 8 10 
𝑥𝑠
∗ 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
tolerate 5 3.9 2.5 1.7 0.9 
Table 1. User route or path setup. 
Starting with the most congested link, link AB, the network 
increases the price by implementing algorithm 2 and price 
increases are illustrated in Figure 3(a).  The congestion in link 
AB is resolved after 3 iterations. That is when the price reaches 
6 unit currency and the aggregated flow becomes feasible at 34. 
This results from users in cluster 1, 2, and 3 remaining in the 
network, while users from class 4 and 5 abandon the network 
because they do not wish to tolerate the poor quality. 
As shown in figure 3(b), lowering the price to 5 leads to each 
user from cluster 1, 2, and 3 receive more bandwidth, resulting 
in the total bandwidth usage of 37.45. This is useful for when the 
network aims to achieve higher throughput. However, table 2 
demonstrates that a higher throughput does not guarantee higher 
revenue. It is because the price, though it has been lowered, may 
still be too high for some users.  For example, as described in 
table 2 and illustrated in Figure 4(a), users in cluster 1 (flow 1) 
receive bandwidth at 1.49 at price 6 and lowering the price to 5 
only increases the bandwidth allocation to 1.76, i.e. additional 
bandwidth at price 5 is insufficient to make up for the loss from 
lower price. Also, reducing the price does not necessarily lead to 
significantly higher utility function (see Figure 4(b)). For these 
reasons, lowering the price may not provide the most desirable 
outcome.   
 Class 1 Class 1 Class 1 Class 1 Class 1 Total Flow Revenue 
Price = 5 1.76 2.64 3.09 0 0 37.45 187.25 
Price = 6 1.49 2.42 2.89 0 0 34 204 
Table 2. Bandwidth allocation to each user at price = 5 and price = 6 which result 
in users from class 4 and 5 abandon the network. 
 
Fig. 3. (a) The price increase in market informed congestion control. (b) The 
aggregated bandwidth allocation for users in class 1,2, and 3at price 5 and 6  unit 
currency).  
However, since users from cluster 1 receive bandwidth below 
the minimum, these users eventually abandon the network when 
they can no longer tolerate the poor QoS. This makes 13.45 
bandwidth units available for distribution to 4 new users in 
cluster 3 at price 6. Each new user receives 2.89 units of 
bandwidth in path ABCD. This leads to a higher revenue and 
throughput as shown in table 3 and Figure 5.   
 
 
Fig. 4: The revenue and the aggregated user utility from users class 1,2, and 3 at 
price 5 and 6 unit currency. 
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Fig. 5. (a) The aggregated bandwidth allocation. (b) network revenue prior to 
self-regulation, after self-regulation from class 1 is applied and bandwidth is 
released, and the addition of four users in class 3 purchase the available 
bandwidth. 
However, since users from cluster 1 receive bandwidth below 
the minimum, these users eventually abandon the network when 
they can no longer tolerate the poor QoS. This makes 13.45 
bandwidth units available for distribution to 4 new users in 
cluster 3 at price 6. Each new user receives 2.89 units of 
bandwidth in path ABCD. This leads to a higher revenue and 
throughput as shown in table 3 and Figure 5.   
Next, Figure 6(a) illustrates that network achieves a higher 
revenue when the price is increased to 8. However, the revenue 
significantly drops when the price reaches 10 because users from 
cluster 1 and 2 self-regulate after receiving bandwidth below the 
minimum (Figure 6(b)), and only users from cluster 3 remain in 
the network. This simulation shows that when network 
undertakes a progressive approach to increasing price to resolve 
congestion, i.e. from low to high, there is a “sweet spot” at price 
8, achieving the highest revenue of 186, as shown in Figure 6(a). 
At this price point, users from cluster 1 choose to abandon the 
network because the price is beyond what they are willing to pay; 
while users in cluster 2 and 3 decide to remain in the network, 
receiving allocation that is above their minimum requirement. 
Figure 7 clearly demonstrates that this “sweet spot” also 
generates higher revenue from lesser number of users than when 
the price is lower at 6 with more users from cluster 1, 2 and 3 in 
the network. 
In a separate experiment, using a strategy opposite of the 
earlier progressive pricing approach, the network charges users 
the highest price they are willing to pay, 10, when congestion 
first occurs and keeps the price at that level. Similar to the earlier 
scenario, highest paying users in cluster 5 self-regulate and 
abandon the network when congestion occurs. When network 
sets the price at 10 to resolve the congestion, cluster 3 and 4 users 
remain in the network, but not users from cluster 1 and 2 because 
this price is too high for the value-seekers. At this price, the 
network generates 275.4 unit currency revenue and a total 
bandwidth usage of 27.54 units. In comparison to the outcome 
of the progressive pricing strategy earlier as described in table 3, 
starting with the highest price yields higher revenue but may 
result in lower throughput due to the less affordable price.  
Both experiments, firstly with progressive price increase and 
secondly with implementing the highest price, show that market-
informed congestion control favors middle class paying users.  
The former approach leads to retention of users in cluster 2 and 
3, while the latter approach retains the upper economical clusters 
of 3 and 4. This is because highest paying customers have very 
low tolerance to poor QoS and expect their minimum 
requirement to be satisfied instantly; any delay results in self-
regulation and immediate abandonment of the network. On the 
other hand, value-seeking users display relatively high tolerance 
for poor QoS, but low tolerance for price increase. Therefore, 
when network continuously fails to meet the minimum 
requirement and price continues to increase, these value users 
eventually leave the network too. This leaves the network with 
users in the medium-price range who demonstrate some level of 
tolerance for both poor QoS and price increase. They are willing 
to pay higher price to a certain extent as long as the minimum is 
fulfilled. This outcome is supported by the study in [28], where 
users are willing to bear higher price to a certain extent for 
products that provides greater satisfaction. For this reason, when 
their demand is met, users from cluster 2, 3 and 4 will remain in 
the network as long as they can afford the price, even if this price 
is higher than the price they are initially willing to pay.  
 
Price = 6 Flow 1 Flow 2 Flow 3 Flow 4 Flow 5 Total 
Flow 
Revenue 
Before 1.49 2.42 2.89 0 0 34 204 
After 0 2.42 2.89 0 0 26.45 158.7 
+ 4 new users  0 2.42 2.89 0 0 39.90 228.04 
Table  3.  Bandwidth allocation on link AB at price 6 before and after users from 
class 1 release the bandwidth, and 4 new additional class 3 users purchase the 
available bandwidth. 
  
Fig. 6. (a) The revenue with price increase from 2 to 4 with user self-regulation. 
(b) The rate allocation to individual users in class 1,2, 3 at price 6-10 unit 
currency.  
 
Fig. 7. Price is increase from 2 to 8 unit currency and keeps the price at 8 unit 
currency. 
Importantly, through MICC scheme, network can be more 
guided in deciding the price to be implemented because the 
network knows the price range users are willing to pay and the 
respective levels of tolerance. Network can choose a price from 
the price range declared, and if it achieves congestion resolution, 
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price can be kept constant at this level even when user landscape 
keeps on changing, which is similar to implementing a flat rate.  
Network only needs to adjust pricing when there is a need to, or 
if it wishes to achieve a more desirable balance between network 
revenue, meeting users’ minimum requirement and QoS. In 
summary, market-informed congestion control allows for a 
controlled dynamic pricing. 
5.2 Discussion 
There will be situations where network may need to choose 
between higher revenue and higher throughput. To illustrate such 
a scenario, we create a similar simulation as the previous section, 
except that we consider a different path setup as described in 
table 4 below.  
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 
Path ABCDE AB AB AB AB 
Table 4. Path set up for users from class 1 to 5. 
At price 6, only users from class 2 and 3 occupy the network, 
resulting in only link AB with flow and other links unused. 
However, if the price is set at 2, users from cluster 1 remain in 
the network, leading to a higher throughput in the network, but 
this would generate lower revenue. In other words, there will be 
situations where network may have to compare the opportunity 
cost of a higher throughput versus that of higher revenue before 
deciding the price. At this point, comparative calculation 
requires a much more complex computation, which defies the 
purpose of market informed congestion control. This problem 
will be addressed in our future work.  
6. CONCLUSION 
Contrary to existing solutions that assume users immediately 
self-regulate and abandon the network when they experience 
poor QoS, our research shows that users in fact display varying 
levels of tolerance that is affected by the price they are willing to 
pay for a product or service. In this paper, we have taken this 
knowledge and proposed a new self-regulate model which 
incorporates the price user is willing to pay and user tolerance. 
With this new self-regulate model, we discover that the network 
is populated by lower-paying users who are dissatisfied.  
With this new understanding, we propose market-informed 
congestion control to resolve congestion, and provides three key 
benefits among others: (a) allows the network to take advantage 
of the market price to decide what kind of users the network is 
capable of supporting; (b) allows the network to chieve its 
objective(s), whether in terms of revenue, throughput or 
aggregate QoS; and (c) controlled dynamic pricing. The latter 
opens the door for a new study on dynamic flat rate, which may 
not fluctuate as much as usage-based pricing scheme. While 
today’s users are used to the buffet style flat rate, i.e. a 
predetermined fixed rate for unlimited data usage, our solution 
allows users and network to find the middle ground between a 
flat rate and dynamic pricing. 
 
APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
We want to show that ?̂?𝑖 provides the upper bound for 𝜆
∗. By 
definition, the condition of convergence is either: 
1. 𝐶 = ∑ 𝑥𝑠𝑠∈𝑆 ,  that is when bottleneck link occurs, 
2. Or 𝜆∗ =  𝜆𝑚𝑖𝑛, that is when there is no bottleneck, which is 
𝐶 ≤ ∑ 𝑥𝑠
∗
𝑠∈𝑆 . 
Assume there exists a constant step size 𝛼 that solves dual 
problem 𝐷(𝜆),  where the solution for (2) converges at 𝜆∗. We 
have ?̂?∗ by solving eq. (8), and also assume that ?̂?∗ ≥ 𝜆𝑚𝑖𝑛. In 
this proof, we present two cases: 
Case 1: 𝜆∗ =  𝜆𝑚𝑖𝑛 , for 𝜆𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≥ 0, and ∑ 𝑥𝑠
∗ 𝑠∈𝑆 ≤  𝐶, which is 
feasible. There exists iteration 𝑡 when the solution for 𝐷(𝜆) 
converges, for 𝑡 ≥ 0.  After iteration 𝑡𝑡ℎ, we have  
𝜆𝑡 ≤ 𝜆𝑚𝑖𝑛. 
By definition that 𝜆𝑡 ≤ 𝜆𝑚𝑖𝑛, then  𝜆𝑡 = 𝜆𝑚𝑖𝑛. Thus, we have 
𝜆𝑡+1 =  [𝜆𝑚𝑖𝑛 − 𝜎𝑡 (𝐶 − ∑ 𝑥𝑠(𝜆
𝑡)
𝑠∈𝑆
 ) ]. 
Since 𝐶 − ∑ 𝑥𝑠(𝜆
𝑡)𝑠∈𝑆 ≥ 0 and 𝜆
𝑡+1 ≤ 𝜆𝑚𝑖𝑛 , then  𝜆𝑡+1 =  𝜆𝑡, 
which is also 𝜆𝑡 − 𝜆𝑚𝑖𝑛. Thus, 𝜆𝑡+1 converges to 𝜆𝑚𝑖𝑛 as 𝑡 →
 ∞. This also implies 𝜆∗ = 𝜆𝑚𝑖𝑛. Since by definition ?̂?∗ ≥
𝜆𝑚𝑖𝑛and we have shown that 𝜆∗ = 𝜆𝑚𝑖𝑛, we have  ?̂?∗ ≥ 𝜆∗. Thus, 
?̂?𝑖 is the upperbound of  𝜆
∗. 
Case 2:   𝜆∗ > 𝜆𝑚𝑖𝑛 and ∑ 𝑥𝑠
∗ 𝑠∈𝑆  ≤  𝐶, which is feasible. For 
simplicity, we define 𝑌𝑡 as follows. 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝜎𝑡 ( 𝐶 − ∑ 𝑥𝑠(𝜆
𝑡)
𝑠∈𝑆
) 
Assume the algorithm converges to an optimal solution 𝜆𝑙
∗ with 
?̂?∗ as the initial price, such that  
lim
𝑡→∞
 |𝑌𝑡| = 0. 
 Next, we show price changes according to e.q. (3).   
𝜆1 = ?̂?∗ − 𝑌0 
𝜆2 =  𝜆1 − 𝑌1 = (?̂?∗ − 𝑌0) − 𝑌1 
𝜆3 =  𝜆2 − 𝑌2 = (?̂?∗ − 𝑌0 − 𝑌1) − 𝑌2 
So, at 𝑡𝑡ℎ iteration we have 
𝜆𝑡 = ?̂?∗ − ∑ 𝑌𝑗
𝑡−1
𝑗=0
. 
Let 𝑡 be the iteration when the algorithm converges, such that 
𝜆∗ = 𝜆𝑡 . Then, we have 
𝜆∗ = 𝜆𝑡 = ?̂?∗ − ∑ 𝑌𝑙
(𝑡)
𝑡−1
𝑡=0
≤  ?̂?𝑖 . 
Therefore, we have shown  𝜆∗ ≤  ?̂?∗of which ?̂?∗ is also the upper 
bound of 𝜆∗ in case 2.  ■ 
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